In re The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Shareholder Litigation
Delaware Court of Chancery
2011 WL 4826104 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2011)
Goldman Sachs's directors (defendants) proposed compensation around 44 percent of net revenues annually from 2007 to 2009, shortly after a government bailout saved the firm from collapse; shareholders (plaintiffs) sued, alleging the "pay for performance" structure encouraged excessive risk-taking harmful to shareholders, pointing to one group that earned $9.06 billion in net revenue in 2008 but still lost $2.7 billion after bonuses, and arguing the Audit Committee's risk oversight had failed. The plaintiffs sought equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duty, though Goldman's charter contained an exculpation provision under 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7).
Must a court hold a corporate board of directors liable for excessive employee compensation?